| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Does Government Precommitment Promote Environmental Innovation? | |
| Emmanuel Petrakis; Anastasios Xepapadeas | |
| 发表日期 | 1998 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1998 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper investigates the effect of credibility of environmental policies on environmental innovation and welfare. When the government precommits to an emission tax, the monopolist's abatement effort is lower than if the environmental policy is at the government's discretion. Time consistent emission tax is lower than optimal emission tax under precommitment. Finally, welfare is always higher if the government can commit to an emission tax. |
| 特色分类 | L12,Q25,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Monopoly,Non-credible policies,Precommitment,Emission Tax,Abatement effort |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/does-government-precommitment-promote-environmental-innovation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emmanuel Petrakis,Anastasios Xepapadeas. Does Government Precommitment Promote Environmental Innovation?. 1998. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1998-088.pdf（548KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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