G2TT
来源类型FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型论文
Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers
Ekkehart Boehmer
发表日期1999
出处Economy and Society
出版年1999
语种英语
摘要I analyse the effect of ownership structure and bank control on performance. I employ a unique data set of 715 German takeovers to test whether group structure, large shareholders, and bank control affect their value to shareholders. First, I find that takeovers increase bidder value, but generally not that of the business group surrounding it. Second, majority owners provide no clear benefit. Third, bank control is only beneficial if it is counter-balanced by another large shareholder. Fourth, the worst takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions.
特色分类G34,G32,G21
关键词Business groups,German banks,Corporate governance,Takeovers
URLhttps://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/business-groups-bank-control-and-large-shareholders-an-analysis-of-german-takeovers/
来源智库Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116412
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ekkehart Boehmer. Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers. 1999.
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