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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers | |
Ekkehart Boehmer | |
发表日期 | 1999 |
出处 | Economy and Society |
出版年 | 1999 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | I analyse the effect of ownership structure and bank control on performance. I employ a unique data set of 715 German takeovers to test whether group structure, large shareholders, and bank control affect their value to shareholders. First, I find that takeovers increase bidder value, but generally not that of the business group surrounding it. Second, majority owners provide no clear benefit. Third, bank control is only beneficial if it is counter-balanced by another large shareholder. Fourth, the worst takeovers are completed by firms that are majority-controlled by financial institutions. |
特色分类 | G34,G32,G21 |
关键词 | Business groups,German banks,Corporate governance,Takeovers |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/business-groups-bank-control-and-large-shareholders-an-analysis-of-german-takeovers/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116412 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ekkehart Boehmer. Business Groups, Bank Control and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of German Takeovers. 1999. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL1999-020.pdf(314KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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