| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency | |
| Enrico C. Perotti; Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden | |
| 发表日期 | 1999 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies product market competition under a strategic transparency decision. Dominant investors can influence information collection in the financial market, and thereby corporate transparency, by affecting market liquidity or the cost of information collection. More transparency on a firm's competitive position has both strategic advantages and disadvantages: in general, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus lenders prefer less information revelation through stock market trading, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equityholders prefer more to make full use of the strategic advantage of a strong firm. We show that bank-controlled firms will tend to discourage trading to reduce price informativeness, while shareholder-run firms prefer more transparency. Our comparitive statics show that bank control may fail to keep firms less transparent as global trading volumes rise. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/dominant-investors-and-strategic-transparency/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116416 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Enrico C. Perotti,Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. Dominant Investors and Strategic Transparency. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1999-024.pdf（359KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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