| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
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| 发表日期 | 1999
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper shows that as long as the stock market has perfect foresight, some dividends are distributed, and incentives are paid more than once or are deferred, stock-related compensation packages are strong incentives for managers to support tacit collusive agreements in repeated oligopolies. The stock market anticipates the losses from punishment phases and discounts them on stock prices, reducing managers' short-run gains from any deviation. When deferred, stock-related incentives may remove all managers' short-run gains from deviation making collusion supportable at any discount factor. The results hold with managerial contracts of any length. |
| 特色分类 | D43,G30,J33,L13,L21
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| 关键词 | CEO Compensation,Delegation,Collusion,Oligopoly,Managerial incentives,Ownership and control,Corporate governance
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/stock-related-compensation-and-product-market-competition/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116427
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition. 1999.
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文件名：
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NDL1999-035.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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