| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Optimal Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises | |
| Giacomo Calzolari | |
| 发表日期 | 1999 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Multinational enterprises (MNEs) have started to populate also regulated sectors. Their linked international activities and credible threats to relocate are then new concerns for regulators. We study a multiprincipal model in which a privately informed MNE (the agent) produces for two countries and is regulated by the two national authorities (the principals). We show that standard theory in the economics of regulation must be reconsidered in a world with MNEs and novel results arise. We study MNE's incentives to allocate resources to lobby the two non-benevolent regulators and we analyse optimal ownership patterns as a substitute for co-operation in regulation between countries. |
| 特色分类 | L51,F23 |
| 关键词 | Multinational enterprises,Regulation,Asymmetric information,Multiprincipal,Lobbying |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/optimal-incentive-regulation-of-multinational-enterprises/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116443 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Calzolari. Optimal Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1999-051.pdf（505KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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