全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem
	Johan Eyckmans; Henry Tulkens
发表日期	1999
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	1999
语种	英语
摘要	In this paper we test empirically with the Nordhaus and Yang (1996) RICE model the core property of the transfer scheme advocated by Germain, Toint and Tulkens (1997). This scheme is designed to sustain full co-operation in a voluntary international environmental agreement by making all countries at least as well off as they would be by joining coalitions adopting emission abatement policies that maximise their coalition payoff; under the scheme no individual country, nor any subset of countries would have an interest in leaving the international environmental agreement. The simulations show that the transfer scheme yields an allocation in the core of the carbon emission abatement game associated with the RICE model. Finally, we discuss some practical implications of the transfer scheme for current climate negotiations.
关键词	Environmental economics,Climate change,Burden sharing,Simulations,Core of co-operative games
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/simulating-with-rice-coalitionally-stable-burden-sharing-agreements-for-the-climate-change-problem/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116463
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Johan Eyckmans,Henry Tulkens. Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem. 1999.

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20119191052384NDL199（503KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览