| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Kyoto Protocol. An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation | |
| Henry Tulkens; Parkash Chander; Jean-Pascal van Ypersele; Stephane Willems | |
| 发表日期 | 1999 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 1999 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Calling upon both positive and normative economics, we attempt to characterise the issues at stake in the current international negotiations on climatic change. We begin (Section 2) by reviewing the main features of the Protocol. Then (Section 3), we identify by means of an elementary economic model the main concepts involved: optimality, non co-operation, coalitional stability. We observe (Section 4) that "business-as-usual", "no regrets" and other domestic policies are alternative ways to conceive of the non co-operative equilibrium prevailing before the negotiations. Which one should be retained? Data suggest that the prevailing situation is a mixed one, exhibiting characteristics of several of these policies. We then turn (Section 5) to interpreting the Protocol. While there is no firm basis to assert that the emission quotas chosen at Kyoto correspond to optimal emissions (although they are a step in the right direction), economic and game theoretical arguments are put forward to support the view that for achieving these emission quotas, trading ensures efficiency, as well as coalitional stability for the agreement provided it is adopted at the largest scale i.e. worldwide. Finally, it is argued in Section 6 that beyond the Kyoto Protocol, the achievement of coalitionally stable optimality at the world level is a real possibility with trading, provided agreement can be reached in the future as to appropriate reference emission levels, in particular as far as developing countries are concerned. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-kyoto-protocol-an-economic-and-game-theoretic-interpretation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116464 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Henry Tulkens,Parkash Chander,Jean-Pascal van Ypersele,et al. The Kyoto Protocol. An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation. 1999. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL1999-072.pdf（255KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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