| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: "Everybody Happy but the Consumer" |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
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| 发表日期 | 1999
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 1999
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper proposes a theory of the anti-competitive effects of debt finance based on the interaction between capital structure, managerial incentives, and firms' ability to sustain collusive agreements. It shows that shareholders' commitments that reduce conflicts with debtholders such as hiring managers with valuable reputations or "conservative" incentives besides reducing the agency costs of debt finance also greatly facilitate tacit collusion in product markets. Concentrated or collusive credit markets, or large banking groups, can ensure the credibility of such commitments (renegotiation-proofness), thereby "exporting" collusion through leverage in otherwise competitive downstream product markets. |
| 特色分类 | D21,G32,L13,L41
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| 关键词 | Banks,oligopoly,financial market product market interaction,capital structure,managerial incentives,collusion,governance
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/debt-as-a-credible-collusive-device-or-everybody-happy-but-the-consumer-/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116486
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device, or: "Everybody Happy but the Consumer". 1999.
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文件名：
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NDL1999-094.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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