| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Partial and Global Cooperation with Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems | |
| Jean-Christophe Pereau; Tarik Tazdait | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper focuses on the link between the group co-operation and the unilateral commitment behaviour of some countries in the presence of global environmental problems. As we consider that this last behaviour occurs when bargaining failed, we call it a precautious commitment. We also show that the emergence of a non-coordinate global co-operation can result from a strategic action from the members of the coalition. The insiders of the coalition create an incentive for the non-members to reduce without co-ordination their emissions. Finally, when we introduce an environmental tax prescribed by the co-operating countries to the non-co-operating ones, co-operation becomes global and co-ordinate. |
| 特色分类 | D74,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Global environmental problems,coalition,unilateral commitment,Nash equilibrium,environmental tax |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/partial-and-global-cooperation-with-unilateral-commitment-in-the-presence-of-global-environmental-problems/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116502 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Christophe Pereau,Tarik Tazdait. Partial and Global Cooperation with Unilateral Commitment in the Presence of Global Environmental Problems. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2000-009.pdf（673KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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