| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Agenda Control in Coalition Formation | |
| Francis Bloch; Stéphane Rottier | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Theoretical models of government formation in political science usually assume that the head of state is non-strategic. In this paper, we analyse the power of an agenda setter who chooses the order in which players are recognised to form coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D72 |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation,agenda control,government formation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/agenda-control-in-coalition-formation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116509 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francis Bloch,Stéphane Rottier. Agenda Control in Coalition Formation. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2000-016.pdf（388KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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