| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Technology Diffusion and the Stability of Climate Coalitions | |
| Richard S.J. Tol; Wietze Lise; Bob van der Zwaan | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Free-riding is a major problem for international climate policy. A country can take advantage of other countries' emission reduction without contributing to abatement policies itself. Game theory suggests that issue linkage may help to overcome free-riding. Earlier studies suggest that if negotiations on greenhouse gas emission reduction are coupled to negotiation on technology transfer, the incentives to co-operate increase. This study confirms that finding. A country has less reason to free-ride if free-riding implies that the countries loses access to desirable, foreign technologies. We also show that, in many cases, it hurts to deny another country access to domestic technologies, if that country retaliates by withholding its technologies. We further show that the losses of withholding abatement technologies are small relative to the gains of free-riding. So, linking greenhouse gas emission reduction with technology diffusion helps to deter free-riding, but only a little bit, and only if the two issues are automatically linked. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/technology-diffusion-and-the-stability-of-climate-coalitions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116513 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Richard S.J. Tol,Wietze Lise,Bob van der Zwaan. Technology Diffusion and the Stability of Climate Coalitions. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2000-020.pdf（66KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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