| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Environmental Liability and Technology Choice:A Duopolistic Analysis |
| Gérard Mondello; M. Tidball
|
| 发表日期 | 2000
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper focuses both on the competition process and the firms liability in environmental
protection and the demonstration is made by comparing two models of safety investment. The
rst one shows sensitive players to their environmental liability: they seek to minimize the
technologies accident risk while the second one corresponds to a much more standard choice. The
players main preoccupation is about their market share even if they care about liability. Then,
from a very simple duopolistic competition model with strict liability, we show, first, that the
way the firms assess the environmental question is not neutral on their expected performances.
Second, that the associated level of technology to the liability concern - i.e. a high level of care or
a low one- have different impact on profitability. Consequently, the competitors general attitude,
their beliefs and the institutional rules have strong e ects on the environmental investment
assessments. More precisely, the enforcing rule the players will adopt will play directly on the
performance, not only of one firm, but on the whole set of industrial firms. |
| 特色分类 | K32,C72,D43,D81
|
| 关键词 | duopoly,environmental investment,liability theory
|
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/environmental-liability-and-technology-choice-a-duopolistic-analysis/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116524
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Gérard Mondello,M. Tidball. Environmental Liability and Technology Choice:A Duopolistic Analysis. 2000.
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|
文件名：
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NDL2000-031.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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