| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Optimal Leniency Programs |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
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| 发表日期 | 2000
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect organised crime. Courageous leniency programmes that reward self-reporting parties may completely and costlessly deter it. When fines/rewards are pure transfers, optimal leniency programmes maximise rewards for self-reporting. When financing rewards are costly, optimal leniency programmes are restricted to the first reporting party, and make this residual claimant for the fines paid by the others. |
| 特色分类 | K42,K21
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| 关键词 | Self reporting,law enforcement,antitrust,cartel deterrence,crime deterrence,organised crime,collusion,corruption,illegal trade
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/optimal-leniency-programs/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116535
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. Optimal Leniency Programs. 2000.
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文件名：
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NDL2000-042.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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