全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Delegation and Information Revelation

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Delegation and Information Revelation
	Axel Gautier; Dimitri Paolini
发表日期	2000
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2000
语种	英语
摘要	This paper addresses the question of delegation in an organisation where there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. We assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques à la Baron Myerson to elicit agent's superior information and in contrast, we posit that the decision and the state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent's information. We can show that delegated decisions completely reveal the state of the world to the principal. Therefore the principal can extract agent's information by giving up the control right over some decisions. As the organisation takes a sequence of decisions, the information learned by the principal can be used for the other decisions. So delegation is only partial: the principal delegates some decisions and keeps control over others.
特色分类	D23,D82,L22
关键词	Incomplete contracts,delegation,signalling game
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/delegation-and-information-revelation/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116540
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Axel Gautier,Dimitri Paolini. Delegation and Information Revelation. 2000.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
NDL2000-047.pdf（773KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览