| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Option to Revoke and Regulation of Local Utilities | |
| Michele Moretto; Paola Valbonesi | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a long-term relationship between a risk-neutral firm that has been delegated to manage a local utility project and a regulator that has always the option-to-revoke the delegation. We show that when the threat of revocation is credible and the cost of exercising it is not too high, the "cooperative" equilibrium is an efficient solution which guarantees the utility with an appropriate level of return. The regulation timing consists of an endogenous regulatory lag where the regulation has a fixed-price nature followed by a period of rate-of-return regulation in which the firm is motivated to adjust its output price downward to avoid revocation. We also show that excessive revocation costs make the firm an unregulated monopolist with an infinite regulatory lag. |
| 特色分类 | C73,L33,L51 |
| 关键词 | Public utilities,option-to-revoke,stochastic games |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/option-to-revoke-and-regulation-of-local-utilities/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116544 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michele Moretto,Paola Valbonesi. Option to Revoke and Regulation of Local Utilities. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2000-051.pdf（482KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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