| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws How Leniency Programs Solve Bertrand's Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo
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| 发表日期 | 2000
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate"' leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and first-price auctions, where no collusion would be supportable otherwise. The reduced sanctions for firms that self-report provide the otherwise missing credible threat necessary to discipline collusive agreements: they ensure that if a firm unilaterally deviates from collusive strategies, other firms find it convenient to punish it by reporting information to the Antitrust Authority. |
| 特色分类 | D43,D44,K21,L41
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| 关键词 | Antitrust law,leniency,self-reporting,cartels,collusion,bid-rigging,oligopoly,auctions
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/self-defeating-antitrust-laws-how-leniency-programs-solve-bertrand-s-paradox-and-enforce-collusion-in-auctions/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116545
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Giancarlo Spagnolo. Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws How Leniency Programs Solve Bertrand's Paradox and Enforce Collusion in Auctions. 2000.
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文件名：
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NDL2000-052.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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