全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?
	Allen Blackman; James Boyd
发表日期	2000
出处	Climate Change and Sustainable Development
出版年	2000
语种	英语
摘要	Increasingly popular tailored regulation (TR) initiatives like EPA's Project XL allow plants to voluntarily substitute site-specific environmental performance standards for command-and-control regulations that dictate pollution abatement strategies. TR can significantly reduce participants' costs of complying with environmental regulations. But in doing so, it can also provide participants with a competitive advantage. We show that this can have undesirable welfare consequences when it enables relatively inefficient firms in oligopolistic markets to "steal" market share from more efficient firms. One critical determinant of whether or not TR has such adverse welfare impacts is the regulator's policy regarding the diffusion of TR agreements among non-participating firms.
特色分类	Q28,L13,L51,K32
关键词	Tailored regulation,voluntary regulation,site-specific,performance standards,regulatory reform
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tailored-regulation-will-voluntary-site-specific-environmental-performance-standards-improve-welfare/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116569
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Allen Blackman,James Boyd. Tailored Regulation: Will Voluntary Site-Specific Environmental Performance Standards Improve Welfare?. 2000.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
NDL2000-076.pdf（439KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览