| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| A Signalling Model of Environmental Overcompliance |
| Vincenzo Denicolò
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| 发表日期 | 2000
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | I model environmental overcompliance as a signalling device. In the model, a benevolent government may or may not tighten environmental standards. Production costs under the stricter environmental regulation are private information to the firms, and tightening environmental policy is socially desirable only if such costs are sufficiently low. The key assumption of the model is that firms differ in the cost of complying, and so those firms that enjoy a comparative advantage may actually benefit from tighter regulation. In these circumstances, such firms may overcomply in order to signal to the government that compliance costs are low, thus inducing the government to enforce stricter regulation. |
| 特色分类 | L13,K32,L50,Q20
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| 关键词 | Environmental regulation,overcompliance,signalling,asymmetric firms
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-signalling-model-of-environmental-overcompliance/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116570
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Vincenzo Denicolò. A Signalling Model of Environmental Overcompliance. 2000.
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文件名：
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NDL2000-077.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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