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来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
规范类型 | 论文 |
A Bargaining Model of Voluntary Environmental Agreements | |
Paola Manzini | |
发表日期 | 2000 |
出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
出版年 | 2000 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We present an explicit model of firm-regulator negotiations in a market with several firms. We describe how the regulatory surplus is distributed between firms and regulator, and analyse the impact of various oligopoly parameters on the resulting level of environmental regulation. Our main result is that a "toughest firm principle" holds: the outcome of negotiations is essentially determined by the firm with the most aggressive attitude towards environmental control. |
URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-bargaining-model-of-voluntary-environmental-agreements/ |
来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116574 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paola Manzini. A Bargaining Model of Voluntary Environmental Agreements. 2000. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
NDL2000-081.pdf(376KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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