| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Collective Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of the Problems of Free-Riding and Collusion | |
| Katrin Millock; François Salanié | |
| 发表日期 | 2000 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2000 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Collective environmental agreements (CEAs) refer to agreements negotiated between a group of polluting firms and a public regulatory body. The article analyses some potential problems with CEAs. First, we study free-riding. We show how the incentive constraint imposed by moral hazard determines the maximum feasible emission reduction under a CEA. When firms are short sighted, free-riding seriously undermines the effectiveness of a CEA. Adding uncertainty about environmental damage or future government action makes it even harder to satisfy the moral hazard constraint. Second, we show that cooperation on a different activity can reduce the incentives to free-ride, since firms can threaten to stop cooperating in order to deter deviations. This effect could explain why some CEAs may be successful. However, we also show that reciprocally the adoption of a CEA increases the possibilities for cooperation on other activities. This might be socially harmful if it translates into price collusion, for example. Finally, we explore the issue of how firms might allocate the abatement effort toward the collective target. We show that a CEA can help firms to coordinate on a reduction of quantity and a consequent price increase in order to benefit from implicit cartel profits. Our findings thus provide some cautionary arguments against the use of CEAs. |
| 特色分类 | D62,L51,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Voluntary agreements,free-riding,collusion,cost-effectiveness |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/collective-environmental-agreements-an-analysis-of-the-problems-of-free-riding-and-collusion/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116601 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Katrin Millock,François Salanié. Collective Environmental Agreements: An Analysis of the Problems of Free-Riding and Collusion. 2000. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2000-108.pdf（442KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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