| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| The Impact of Voluntary Environmental Agreements on Firmns' Incentives for Technology Adoption |
| Markus A. Lehmann
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| 发表日期 | 2000
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2000
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | The paper reconsiders the Porter hypothesis in an offer/counter-offer bargaining model, in which a welfare-maximising regulator and an industry representative negotiate over which regulatory instrument to apply with which stringency. The possibility to contest planned regulation in the political arena is given as an outside option of the bargaining model. Policy instruments differ in their impacts on firms' profits and market shares, which yields different incentives for technology adoption. Furthermore, means of direct regulation may lead to an implicit cartelisation of the industry. This latter feature shapes the actors' equilibrium threat position, which, in turn, influences incentives to contest the regulation and the subsequent regulatory outcome. Depending on the parties' respective position in the political contest, the implementation of voluntary agreements or of other (negotiated or mandatory) policy instruments, as well as their impact on the technology adoption incentives, is endogenously derived within this single model. |
| 特色分类 | D78,C78
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| 关键词 | Voluntary agreements,technology adoption,Porter Hypothesis
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-impact-of-voluntary-environmental-agreements-on-firmns-incentives-for-technology-adoption/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116603
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Markus A. Lehmann. The Impact of Voluntary Environmental Agreements on Firmns' Incentives for Technology Adoption. 2000.
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文件名：
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NDL2000-110.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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