| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Regulation at Home, Competition Abroad: A Theoretical Framework | |
| Carlo Scarpa; Giacomo Calzolari | |
| 发表日期 | 2001 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyses in a hidden characteristic set-up the design of the optimal price for a firm which is a monopolist at home but competes abroad against foreign firms. As long as diseconomies of scope are not too strong, the optimal price is identified. The price rule depends on the sign of the technological relationship between home output and foreign output. With economies of scope, the regulator should set a price below marginal cost, in order to help the firm in the foreign market, and vice-versa with diseconomies of scope. Informational asymmetry introduces a distortion in the price rule, which is usually amplified by the existence of a foreign market. |
| 特色分类 | L51,L97,F23 |
| 关键词 | Regulation,asymmetric information,multinational |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/regulation-at-home-competition-abroad-a-theoretical-framework/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116642 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carlo Scarpa,Giacomo Calzolari. Regulation at Home, Competition Abroad: A Theoretical Framework. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2001-039.pdf（638KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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