全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects

G2TT

来源类型	FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
规范类型	论文
	On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects
	Gian Luigi Albano; Fabrizio Germano; Stefano Lovo
发表日期	2001
出处	Economy and Society
出版年	2001
语种	英语
摘要	We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
特色分类	C72,D44
关键词	Multi-unit auctions,ascending auctions,FCC auctions,
URL	https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-some-collusive-and-signaling-equilibria-in-ascending-auctions-for-multiple-objects/
来源智库	Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116665
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Gian Luigi Albano,Fabrizio Germano,Stefano Lovo. On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects. 2001.