| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| What Do Internal Capital Markets Do? Redistribution vs Incentives |
| Axel Gautier; Florian Heider
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| 发表日期 | 2001
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2001
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In this paper we explain the apparent ''diversification discount'' of conglomerates without assuming inefficient-cross subsidisation through internal capital markets. Instead we assume that an internal capital market efficiently redistributes scare resources across a conglomerate's divisions between successive production periods. The need for redistribution arises from the fact that resources may sometimes be produced by divisions which happen to be successful in an earlier production stage but which do not have the best investment opportunities in future production stages.In contrast to the existing literature we consider explicitly the incentive problem between corporate headquarter and divisional managers using a standard Moral-Hazard framework. We show that although a complete incentive contract can be written bilaterally between headquarter and divisional managers, the redistribution of resources across divisions creates additional agency costs in a conglomerate.Moreover, assuming that no complete contract can govern the interim redistribution policy by the headquarter, we show how the agency problem with divisional managers constrains headquarters interim redistribution to be ex ante inefficient. |
| 特色分类 | G31,G34,L23
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| 关键词 | Corporate finance,industrial organisation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/what-do-internal-capital-markets-do-redistribution-vs-incentives/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116679
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Axel Gautier,Florian Heider. What Do Internal Capital Markets Do? Redistribution vs Incentives. 2001.
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文件名：
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NDL2001-076.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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