| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons | |
| Pierre Lasserre; Antoine Soubeyran | |
| 发表日期 | 2001 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper revisits the tragedy of the commons when agents have different capabilities in both production and encroachment activities, and can allocate their time between them. Under fairly general assumptions on production and encroachment technologies, an individual's expected income is convex with respect to his actions so that individuals specialize. Consequently, in equilibrium, the economy is divided into at most two homogeneous groups: encroachers and producers. The partition obeys a relative advantage criterion. Several equilibria may exist. The "tragedy of the commons" equilibrium without production always does; the Pareto optimal allocation of activities may not be an equilibrium. We show that minute changes in property right enforcement may lead to drastic improvements for society. We argue that, in convex games such as this paper's role choice game, bounded rationality is a natural assumption, and the concept of local Nash equilibrium is the natural analytical tool to handle it. |
| 特色分类 | D23,D62,D7,K00 |
| 关键词 | Property rights,institutions,commons,convexity,general equilibrium,bounded rationality |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-ricardian-model-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116683 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pierre Lasserre,Antoine Soubeyran. A Ricardian Model of the Tragedy of the Commons. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2001-080.pdf（574KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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