| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game | |
| Jean Christophe Péreau; Pierre Courtois; Tarik Tazdaït | |
| 发表日期 | 2001 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2001 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We describe in this paper an evolutionary game theoretic model aiming at representing the climate change negotiation. The model is used to examine the outcome of climate change negotiations in a framework which seeks to closely represent negotiation patterns. Evolutionary setting allows us to consider a decision making structure characterised by agents with bounded knowledge practising mimics and learning from past events and strategies. We show on that framework that a third significant alternative to the binary coordination-defection strategies needs to be considered: a unilateral commitment as precautionary strategy. As a means to widen cooperation, we examine the influence of linking environmental and trade policies via the implementation of a trade penalty on non cooperative behaviours. |
| 特色分类 | D74,Q28 |
| 关键词 | Environmental negotiation,coalition,precautionary unilateral commitment,evolutionary process |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/an-evolutionary-approach-to-the-climate-change-negotiation-game/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116684 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean Christophe Péreau,Pierre Courtois,Tarik Tazdaït. An Evolutionary Approach to the Climate Change Negotiation Game. 2001. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2001-081.pdf（1150KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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