| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Investment and Asymmetric Information |
| Larry Karp; Jiangfeng Zhang
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| 发表日期 | 2001
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2001
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling green-house gases. The endogeneity of investment favors taxes, and it increases abatement. |
| 特色分类 | C61,D8,H21,Q28
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| 关键词 | Pollution control,investment,uncertainty,rational expectations,choice of instruments
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/controlling-a-stock-pollutant-with-endogenous-investment-and-asymmetric-information/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116698
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Larry Karp,Jiangfeng Zhang. Controlling a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Investment and Asymmetric Information. 2001.
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文件名：
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NDL2001-095.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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