| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| What Does Monetary Policy Reveal about Central Bank's Preferences? | |
| Paolo Surico; Efrem Castelnuovo | |
| 发表日期 | 2002 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The design of monetary policy depends upon the targeting strategy adopted by the central bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural parameters to analyse monetary policy making. Accordingly, we develop a novel calibration method to identify central bank's preferences from the estimates of an optimal Taylor-type rule. The empirical analysis on US data shows that output stabilization has not been an independent argument in the Fed's objective function during the Greenspan era. This suggests that the output gap has entered the policy rule only as leading indicator for future inflation, therefore being only instrumental (to stabilize inflation) rather than important per se. |
| 特色分类 | C61,E52,E58 |
| 关键词 | Central bank's preferences,calibration,inflation targeting,optimal monetary policy |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/what-does-monetary-policy-reveal-about-central-bank-s-preferences/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Paolo Surico,Efrem Castelnuovo. What Does Monetary Policy Reveal about Central Bank's Preferences?. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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