| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions | |
| Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; D. Marc Kilgour | |
| 发表日期 | 2002 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2002 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally single-peaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering, cardinal single-peakedness precludes this possibility, based on two models of coalition formation:• Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until a majority coalition forms.• Build-Up (BU): Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions form, they fuse into composite players, whose positions are defined cardinally and who are treated as single players in the convergence process.FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, whereas BU—because all subcoalition members must be included in any majority coalition that forms—restricts combinatorial possibilities and tends to produce less compact majority coalitions. Applications of the models to legislatures, parliamentary coalitions, and military alliances are discussed. |
| 特色分类 | C78,D71 |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation,dynamic analysis,single-peakedness,legislatures |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/single-peakedness-and-disconnected-coalitions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116731 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven J. Brams,Michael A. Jones,D. Marc Kilgour. Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions. 2002. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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