| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| On the Stability of Cooperation Structures |
| Guillaume Haeringer
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| 发表日期 | 2002
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2002
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [Econometrica, 57 (1989), 589--614]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72
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| 关键词 | Cooperation structure,graph,Myerson value,stability,potential
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-the-stability-of-cooperation-structures/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116732
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Guillaume Haeringer. On the Stability of Cooperation Structures. 2002.
|
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