| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers | |
| Anna Alberini; Alberto Longo; Stefania Tonin; Francesco Trombetta | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine different market-based mechanisms and other incentives intended to promote the environmental remediation and reuse of brownfields. Policies that encourage cleanup and re-use of brownfields offer real estate developers reductions in regulatory burden, relief from liability for future cleanups once certain mitigation standards are met, and/or financial support for regeneration of brownfields. We use conjoint choice experiments—a stated preference approach—to assess the responses of real estate developers to different mixes of these incentives. Our survey instrument was administered in person to a sample of developers and real estate professionals randomly intercepted at the Marché International des Professionnels de l'Immobilier (MIPIM) in Cannes, France, in March 2002. Conditional and random-coefficient logit models of the responses to the choice questions indicate that developers find sites with contamination problems less attractive than others, and that they value liability relief. This confirms our expectation that contaminated sites are less desirable because of the associated cleanup costs, but refutes earlier claims that liability does not matter. Our developers are not deterred by prior contamination, once it has been cleaned up, suggesting that "contamination stigma" is not very important, and appreciate fast-track review of development and remediation plans, direct financial incentives, and flexible (negotiable) cleanup standards. Developers with prior experience with contaminated sites are more responsive to the policies than are inexperienced developers, especially for subsidies. Inexperienced developers are more responsive to liability relief and regulatory relief than they are to subsidies. Similar considerations hold true for larger developers. |
| 特色分类 | Q28,R38 |
| 关键词 | Brownfields,Contaminated sites,Real Estate Developers,Stated Preferences,Conjoint Analysis,Liability Relief,Regulatory Relief,Subsidies |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-role-of-liability-regulation-and-economic-incentives-in-brownfield-remediation-and-redevelopment-evidence-from-surveys-of-developers/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116835 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anna Alberini,Alberto Longo,Stefania Tonin,et al. The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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