| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information | |
| Alejandro Caparros; Jean-Christophe Pereau; Tarik Tazdaït | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement. |
| 特色分类 | C78,D74,H77 |
| 关键词 | bargaining theory,asymmetric information,climate change,international cooperation |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/north-south-climate-change-negotiations-a-sequential-game-with-asymmetric-information/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116837 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alejandro Caparros,Jean-Christophe Pereau,Tarik Tazdaït. North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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