| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities |
| Sergio Currarini
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We study the group stability of collective decision making when society is organized according to a non directed graph, and groups' payoff possibilities are given by a partition function. We focus on the stability properties of hierarchical organizations, formally described by minimally connected graphs (or trees). Building on previous works by Greenberg and Weber (1986, 1993) and by Demange (1994, 2001), we restrict the ability of raising objections to proposed payoff imputations to coalitions that are connected in the organization. We show that the stability properties of hierachical organizations, proved in Demange (1994, 2002), extend to partition function games with negative externalities. Under positive externalities, although not ensuring social stability, hierarchies are the "most stable" organizational forms for society. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-the-stability-of-hierarchies-in-games-with-externalities/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116847
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sergio Currarini. On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities. 2003.
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文件名：
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NDL2003-019.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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