| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Monopoly with Resale | |
| Alessandro Pavan; Giacomo Calzolari | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies revenue-maximizing mechanisms for a monopolist who expects her buyers to resell in a secondary market. We consider two modes of resale: the first is to a third party who does not participate in the primary market; the second is inter-bidders resale, where the winner in the primary market resells to the losers. We show that resale to third parties is revenue-enhancing for the initial monopolist, whereas inter-bidders resale is revenue-decreasing compared to the case where resale is prohibited.The revenue-maximizing mechanisms in the primary market are obtained by investigating the optimal informational linkage with the secondary market. The results show that to sustain higher resale prices the monopolist may find it optimal (a) to induce stochastic allocations in the primary market, and (b) to design a disclosure policy that optimally controls for the information revealed to the participants in the secondary market. The optimal allocation rule and disclosure policy maximize the expected sum of the bidders' resale-augmented virtual valuations, taking into account the effect of information disclosure on the price formation process in the secondary market. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D82 |
| 关键词 | Monopoly,information linkage between primary and secondary markets,optimal auction with resale,resale-augmented virtual valuations |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/monopoly-with-resale/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116848 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Pavan,Giacomo Calzolari. Monopoly with Resale. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-020.pdf（806KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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