| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition |
| Claudio Mezzetti
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Agents' valuations are interdependent if they depend on the signals of all agents. Previous literature has claimed that with interdependent valuations and multidimen-sional, but independent, signals, efficient auction design is impossible. This paper shows that, on the contrary, it is always possible to find efficient auction mechanisms. Furthermore, it characterizes the conditions under which it is possible to extract the full surplus from the agents. Finally, it shows that it is also possible to provide agents with the incentives for the efficient, ex-ante acquisition of information. All these results rest on the application of a generalized version of the revelation principle, which requires that the designer uses two reporting stages. |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/auction-design-with-interdependent-valuations-the-generalized-revelation-principle-efficiency-full-surplus-extraction-and-information-acquisition/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116849
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Claudio Mezzetti. Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition. 2003.
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文件名：
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NDL2003-021.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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