| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions | |
| Alessandro Pavan; Marco LiCalzi | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Uniform-price auctions of a divisible good in fixed supply admit underpricing equilibria, where bidders submit high inframarginal bids to prevent competition on prices. The seller can obstruct this behavior by tilting her supply schedule and making the amount of divisible good on offer change endogenously with its (uniform) price. Precommitting to an increasing supply curve is a strategic instrument to reward aggressive bidding and enhance expected revenue. A fixed supply may not be optimal even when accounting for the cost to the seller of issuing a quantity different from her target supply. |
| 特色分类 | D44,E58 |
| 关键词 | Uniform-price auction,divisible good,strategic role of the seller,endogenous supply,Treasury and IPO auctions |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/tilting-the-supply-schedule-to-enhance-competition-in-uniform-price-auctions/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116850 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandro Pavan,Marco LiCalzi. Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-022.pdf（553KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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