| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Bidding among Friends and Enemies |
| David Ettinger
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Economy and Society
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | We consider an auction setting in which potential buyers, even if they fail to obtain the good, care about the price paid by the winner. We study the impact of these price-externalities on the first-price auction and the second-price auction in a symmetric information framework. First, we consider situations in which bidders care about the price paid independently from the identity of the winner. We prove that the first-price auction is not affected by this kind of price-externalities while the second-price auction is. In broader specifications, we observe though that the first-price auction can be affected by the presence of such price-externalities. In any case, in comparison with the first-price auction, the second-price auction exacerbates the effects of price-externalities whatever their types. Therefore, there is no revenue equivalence between the two auction formats. |
| 特色分类 | D44,D62,G32
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| 关键词 | Auctions,revenue,allocation,externalities,toeholds,budget-constraints
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/bidding-among-friends-and-enemies/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116851
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
David Ettinger. Bidding among Friends and Enemies. 2003.
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文件名：
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NDL2003-023.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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