| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Auction Design without Commitment | |
| Hannu Vartiainen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary equilibria are characterized in the language of vonNeumann-Morgenstern stable sets. This simplifies the analysis remarkably. In the one buyer case, we obtain the Coase conjecture: the buyer obtains all the surplus and efficiency is reached. However, in the multiple buyer case the seller can achieve more: she is able to commit to the English auction. Typically the converse also holds, the English auction is the only stable auction mechanism. |
| 特色分类 | C72,D44,D78 |
| 关键词 | Auction theory,commitment,stable sets |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/auction-design-without-commitment/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116852 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hannu Vartiainen. Auction Design without Commitment. 2003. |
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| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-024.pdf（743KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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