| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Auctions with Financial Externalities | |
| Emiel Maasland; Sander Onderstal | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Economy and Society |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers' utilities depend on how much the winner pays. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected revenue. The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous effects. We further show that a resale market does not have an effect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB. With a reserve price, we find an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price. For SPSB we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium |
| 特色分类 | D44 |
| 关键词 | Auctions,financial externalities,reserve price,resale market |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/auctions-with-financial-externalities/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116858 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emiel Maasland,Sander Onderstal. Auctions with Financial Externalities. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-030.pdf（497KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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