| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games | |
| Michael Finus; Bianca Rundshagen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive externality NTU-games. First, in the spirit of Hart/Kurz (1983), we develop a game that we call -game and show that strong Nash equilibria coalition structures in this game are identical to α- and β-core stable coalition structures. Second, as a by-product of the definition of the -game, we develop an extension called an game. Finally, we compare equilibria in theH- and I-game with those in the Δ- and Ѓ-game of Hart and Kurz (1983). |
| 特色分类 | C72 |
| 关键词 | Core-stability,non-cooperative game theory,positive externality games |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/a-non-cooperative-foundation-of-core-stability-in-positive-externality-ntu-coalition-games/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116859 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Bianca Rundshagen. A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-031.pdf（470KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
