| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers | |
| Michael Hoel; Rolf Golombek | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study climate policy when there are technological spillovers between countries, and there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. The non-cooperative equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the Kyoto case, whereas with a harmonized domestic carbon tax R&D expenditures could even be too high. |
| 特色分类 | O30;H23;Q20;Q28;Q48 |
| 关键词 | Climate policy,international environmental agreements,R&D,technology spillovers |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/climate-policy-under-technology-spillovers/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116866 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Hoel,Rolf Golombek. Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers. 2003. |
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