| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation | |
| Vincent Vannetelbosch; Ana Mauleon | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition structures are possibly stable when players are farsighted. We also introduce a refinement, the largest cautious consistent set, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the largest consistent set and is the unique one to belong to the largest cautious consistent set. |
| 特色分类 | C70,C71,C72,C78 |
| 关键词 | Coalition formation,Farsightedness,Cautiousness,Positive spillovers,Largest consistent set |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/farsightedness-and-cautiousness-in-coalition-formation/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116880 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vincent Vannetelbosch,Ana Mauleon. Farsightedness and Cautiousness in Coalition Formation. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| NDL2003-052.pdf（2106KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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