| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation |
| Matthew Haag; Roger Lagunoff
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in a repeated, n-person, continuous action generalization of a Prisoner's Dilemma game. When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how "much" cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with the group's size and structure? For an arbitrary distribution of discount factors, we characterize the maximal average co-operation (MAC) likelihood of this game. The MAC likelihood is the highest average level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths, that the group can achieve. The MAC likelihood is shown to be increasing in monotone shifts, and decreasing in mean preserving spreads, of the distribution of discount factors. The latter suggests that more heterogeneous groups are less cooperative on average. Finally, we establish weak conditions under which the MAC likelihood exhibits increasing returns to scale when discounting is heterogeneous. That is, larger groups are more cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. By contrast, when the group has a common discount factor, the MAC likelihood is invariant to group size. |
| 特色分类 | C7,D62,D7
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| 关键词 | Repeated games,Maximal average Cooperation likelihood,Heterogeneous discount factors,Returns to scale
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/on-the-size-and-structure-of-group-cooperation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116882
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Matthew Haag,Roger Lagunoff. On the Size and Structure of Group Cooperation. 2003.
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