| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game | |
| Ekko van Ierland; Michael Finus; Rob Dellink | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high, stable coalitions emerge, though they only marginally improve upon the Nash equilibrium. We explain this phenomenon by analyzing the individual incentive structure of all regions and relate our results to the predictions of theory. |
| 特色分类 | C72,H41,Q25 |
| 关键词 | International environmental agreements,Kyoto-Protocol,Cartel formation game,Non-cooperative game theory |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/stability-of-climate-coalitions-in-a-cartel-formation-game/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116889 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ekko van Ierland,Michael Finus,Rob Dellink. Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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