| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements | |
| Michael Finus; Bianca Rundshagen | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take place and/or different designs of agreements. We consider open and restricted open membership game as well as four exclusive membership games with different degrees of unanimity required to form coalitions. From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under exclusive than under open membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future treaty-making. |
| 特色分类 | C72,H41,Q20 |
| 关键词 | Non-cooperative game theory,Rules of coalition formation,Stability |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/how-the-rules-of-coalition-formation-affect-stability-of-international-environmental-agreements/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116890 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael Finus,Bianca Rundshagen. How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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