| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against Environmental Regulation |
| Y. Hossein Farzin; Jinhua Zhao
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | In this paper, we study a firm's optimal lobby behavior and its effect on investment in pollution abatement capital. We develop a dynamic framework where a representative firm can invest in both abatement and lobby capital in response to a possible future increase in pollution tax. We show that when the firm lobbies against the scale of the tax increase at a predetermined date, it should act like an occasional lobbyer by investing a lump-sum (optimal) amount in the lobby capital only at that date. But, to delay the new tax, it should act like a habitual lobbyer by investing continuously and at increasing rates over an optimal time period. We show that lobby expenditure crowds out investment in abatement capital and that this effect is stronger the more efficient is the lobbying activity. Further, we show that while uncertainty about the magnitude of the tax reduces the firm's incentive to lobby, uncertainty about the timing of the new tax increases it. |
| 特色分类 | H32,D81,D92,Q28
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/pollution-abatement-investment-when-firms-lobby-against-environmental-regulation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116910
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Y. Hossein Farzin,Jinhua Zhao. Pollution Abatement Investment When Firms Lobby Against Environmental Regulation. 2003.
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文件名：
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NDL2003-082.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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