| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation |
| Parkash Chander
|
| 发表日期 | 2003
|
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
|
| 出版年 | 2003
|
| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | This paper reinterprets the ã -core (Chander and Tulkens (1995, 1997)) and justifies it as well as its prediction that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. It is assumed that coalitions can freely merge or break apart, are farsighted (that is, it is the final and not the immediate payoffs that matter to the coalitions) and a coalition may deviate if and only if it stands to gain from it. It is then shown that subsequent to a deviation by a coalition, the nonmembers will have incentives to break apart into singletons, as is assumed in the definition of the ã - characteristic function, and that the grand coalition is the only stable coalition structure. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72,D62
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| 关键词 | Core,Characteristic function,Strategic games,Coalition formation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/the-gamma-core-and-coalition-formation/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116922
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Parkash Chander. The Gamma-Core and Coalition Formation. 2003.
|
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