| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters | |
| Steven J. Brams; Michael A. Jones; D.Marc Kilgour | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Players are assumed to rank each other as coalition partners. Two processes of coalition formation are defined and illustrated: •Fallback (FB):Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until some majority coalition, all of whose members consider each other mutually acceptable, forms. •Build-up (BU):Same descent as FB, except only majorities whose members rank each other highest form coalitions. BU coalitions are stable in the sense that no member would prefer to be in another coalition, whereas FB coalitions, whose members need not rank each other highest, may not be stable. BU coalitions are bimodally distributed in a random society, with peaks around simple majority and unanimity the distributions of majorities in the US Supreme Count and in the US House of Representatives follow this pattern. The dynamics of real-life coalition-formation processes are illustrated by two Supreme Court cases. |
| 特色分类 | D72,C78 |
| 关键词 | Coalition dynamics,Fallback bargaining,Manipulability,Legislatures,US Supreme Court |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/forming-stable-coalitions-the-process-matters/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116925 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven J. Brams,Michael A. Jones,D.Marc Kilgour. Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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