| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| Decentralised Job Matching | |
| Guillaume Haeringer; Myrna Wooders | |
| 发表日期 | 2003 |
| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development |
| 出版年 | 2003 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching. |
| 特色分类 | C78,C62,J41 |
| 关键词 | Two-sided matching,Job market,Subgame perfect equilibrium,irreversibilities |
| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/decentralised-job-matching/ |
| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116943 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guillaume Haeringer,Myrna Wooders. Decentralised Job Matching. 2003. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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