| 来源类型 | FEEM working papers "Note di lavoro" series
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems |
| Hideo Konishi; M. Utku Unver
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| 发表日期 | 2003
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| 出处 | Climate Change and Sustainable Development
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| 出版年 | 2003
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any "executable" group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. |
| 特色分类 | C71,C72,C78,J41
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| 关键词 | Multi-partner matching problem,Pairwise stable matching network,Credible group deviation
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| URL | https://www.feem.it/en/publications/feem-working-papers-note-di-lavoro-series/credible-group-deviation-in-multi-partner-matching-problems/
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| 来源智库 | Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Italy)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/116944
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Hideo Konishi,M. Utku Unver. Credible Group-Deviation in Multi-Partner Matching Problems. 2003.
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